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An Impaired State of the Law
WHY NEW YORK’S APPROACH TO LINGUISTIC
MINORITIES AND ROADWAY SAFETY IS
SHORTSIGHTED
INTRODUCTION
By some estimates, an individual who regularly drinks
and drives will have done so 80 times before he or she is arrested
for a Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) charge.1 Given the low
probability of being apprehended for a DWI, drunk drivers have
little incentive in this regard to obey impaired driving laws, a fact
illustrated by the alarming statistic that one in three individuals
arrested for a first time DWI offense will be arrested again for
another DWI charge.2
The risk to the public cannot be understated. In 2012,
29.1 million Americans admitted that they had driven “under
the influence of alcohol” that year.3 Each episode endangered not
only the life of the impaired driver but countless other innocent
pedestrians, passengers, and motorists. Thus, millions of
innocent lives are senselessly put at risk each year. Such
prevalence inevitably breeds tragedy. In the United States, 28
people die every day as a result of alcohol-impaired-driving
fatalities,4 defined as a person killed in a crash involving a
driver with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of .08 grams per
deciliter or higher.5 In 2013, there were approximately 10,076 of
these accidents.6 This figure represents 31% of all motor vehicle
fatalities.7 Drunk driving, without a doubt, continues to be a
lethal public safety concern.
1 Sober to Start, MADD35, http://www.madd.org/drunk-driving/ignition-interlocks/
(last visited Mar. 27, 2015).
2 Id.
3 Drunk Driving Statistics, MADD35, http://www.madd.org/drunk-driving/
about/drunk-driving-statistics.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2015).
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Drunk or impaired driving remains a persistent problem
for law enforcement as well. In 2011, over 1 million Americans
were arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol or
narcotics.8 That is more than the total number of Americans
arrested for murder, non-negligent homicide, robbery, aggravated
assault, burglary, and forcible rape combined that year.9 Unlike
the occurrence of homicides, assaults, or robberies, victimization
through a motor vehicle operated by an intoxicated driver seems
to have a particular element of randomness or spontaneity.
Accordingly, the onus is on law enforcement and prosecutors to
ensure that these impaired drivers get as few opportunities as
possible to get behind a wheel. Since the early 1980s, with the
passage of The National Minimum Drinking Age Act and the
creation of Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), there has
been a seemingly unstoppable march in favor of heightened
prosecution of motorists who operate their vehicles under the
influence of alcohol.10 Despite such a dogmatic resolve, a series of
cases from New York City may test this commitment to justice.
Over the last five years, a line of New York cases,
beginning with People v. Garcia-Cepero,11 have challenged the
constitutionality of the procedure used by the New York Police
Department (NYPD) to gauge a DWI suspect’s level of sobriety.
As the procedure currently stands, if a motorist is stopped for a
suspected DWI, he or she will be subjected to a breathalyzer test
to measure his or her Blood Alcohol Content (BAC).12 This
breathalyzer test may be administered at the scene of the
incident or at one of six Intoxicated Driver Testing Units (IDTU)
located throughout the city, with two in Manhattan and one in
each of the remaining four boroughs.13
Typically, the breathalyzer test is followed by the
administration of the Standardized Field Sobriety Tests (SFST),
a physical coordination test that has been standard procedure
for many police departments around the country since 1981, to
identify impaired motor vehicle operators.14 The SFST is more
8 Crime in the United States 2011, Estimated Number of Arrests: United
States 2011. FBI: FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/
crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/tables/table-29.
9 Id.
10 History Speaks for Itself, MADD35, http://www.madd.org/underage-drinking/
why21/history.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2015).
11 See People v. Garcia-Cepero, 874 N.Y.S.2d 689 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008).
12 Id.
13 New Rules for DWI Suspects in New York City, WABC EYEWITNESS NEWS
(Dec. 27, 2009), http://abclocal.go.com/wabc/story?section=news/local&id=7189908.
14 JACK STUSTER ET AL., NAT’LHIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., EVALUATION
OF THE EFFECTS OF SFST TRAINING ON IMPAIRED DRIVER ENFORCEMENT, NHTSA.,
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commonly known as the coordination test where a police officer
asks a motorist suspected of being intoxicated to walk in a
straight line, touch his or her nose, stand on one leg, and
perform other relatively simple tasks designed to gauge that
suspect’s sobriety. Unlike the breathalyzer test, the coordination
test is not administered to all DWI suspects.15 Since the
administration of the test is contingent on the NYPD officer being
able to clearly verbally communicate with the suspect, the test is
not offered in situations where the presiding officer is faced with
an insurmountable language barrier, and is thus only offered to
English-speaking DWI suspects.16
Accordingly, non-English-speaking defendants convicted of
DWIs have recently claimed that the NYPD’s procedure violates
their equal protection and due process rights under the United
States and New York Constitutions.17 New York courts have
previously been inconsistent in their deliberations on the legal
claims presented by this class of litigants, particularly in the level
of scrutiny they apply to the constitutional challenges levied.18
Part I of this note will review the constitutional framework
under which the recent challenges to the NYPD procedure have
been analyzed. Part II will review the relevant case history which
gave rise to the legal dilemma addressed by the following parts,
namely, the judicial split amongst New York courts where some
courts employed a strict scrutiny standard of review in
adjudicating the constitutional claims raised against the NYPD
protocol,19 while others adopted a rational basis standard,20
which has traditionally been considered to be a much lower legal
threshold for the state to meet.21 Next, Part III will discuss and
analyze the challenges raised against the NYPD policy under
the federal and New York Constitutions. Finally, Part IV will
TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS RESEARCHNOTENO. DOTHS 811 455 (May 2011). The SFST was
initially developed by the National Highway Safety Administration, which started
funding research into the SFST in 1975. Id. The SFST is in actuality a series of three
separate tests: the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test, the walk-and-turn test, and
the one-leg stand test. Id. The SFST is used in all fifty states and has become standard
pre-arrest protocol in most police departments. Id.
15 Garcia-Cepero, 874 N.Y.S.2d at 692.
16 Id. at 695.
17 Id. at 698; People v. Perez, 898 N.Y.S.2d 402, 404 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010);
People v. Molina, 887 N.Y.S.2d 784, 788 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009); People v. Burnet, 882
N.Y.S.2d 835, 838 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
18 Perez, 898 N.Y.S.2d at 404; Molina, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 788; Burnet, 882
N.Y.S.2d at 838; Garcia-Cepero, 874 N.Y.S.2d at 692.
19 See, e.g.,Molina, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 794
20 Garcia-Cepero, 874 N.Y.S.2d at 695-96.
21 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1985).
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put forward a suggested approach that New York courts can
follow, which would allow the NYPD to effectively protect the
public from drunk drivers while simultaneously preserving the
possibility of future legal safeguards for linguistic minorities.
Rather than choose between rational basis review, which often
acts as a judicial rubber stamp on government action, or strict
scrutiny review, which views the government action in question
as inherently suspect,22 New York courts should review challenges
to government classifications based on language under an
intermediate level of review, also referred to as rational basis
plus. Applying an intermediate level of scrutiny would allow the
judiciary to engage in the meticulous scrutiny associated with
strict scrutiny analysis if it found such scrutiny was warranted.
However, it would also allow courts to uphold language
classifications which are instituted to fulfill legitimate government
objectives, essentially splitting the proverbial difference.
I. CONSTITUTIONALITY OFGOVERNMENT CLASSIFICATIONS
BASED ON LANGUAGE
The majority of defendants who have challenged the
NYPD procedure have challenged it under both the federal and
New York Constitutions. The Equal Protection Clause of the
14th Amendment dictates that:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.23
Under the 14th Amendment, the government is
constitutionally barred from passing legislation that differentiates
between individuals based on so-called suspect classifications, race,
religion, and ethnicity, unless it can prove that the classification is
narrowly tailored towards the fulfillment of a compelling state
interest.24 This exacting, highly scrupulous inquiry is often referred
to as strict scrutiny analysis and is only appropriate when a
government action restricts a fundamental right or employs a
suspect classification. The use of these suspect classifications is so
seldom associated with furthering a legitimate government interest
22 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
23 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
24 Clarke v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978); Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
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that a court reviewing such a classification begins its analysis with
the judicial presumption of invalidity.25
Typically, government action which does not infringe on a
fundamental right or employ a suspect classification is subject to
rational basis analysis.26 In stark contrast to the meticulous
scrutiny of a strict scrutiny analysis, under a rational basis
analysis, the state need only prove that that the government
action in question is rationally related to a legitimate government
interest.27 Historically, this standard of review has been
extremely deferential to the government and is often met once the
government puts forward a plausible correlation between its
challenged classification and a public policy concern.28 Whereas
government action subject to strict scrutiny begins with a judicial
presumption of invalidity, a court reviewing a statute or policy
under rational basis review holds no such predispositions.29
When presented with the question of whether a
classification based on language warrants strict scrutiny
analysis, federal courts have resoundingly answered in the
negative. In Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, predominantly Spanish-
speaking plaintiffs were initially denied various Social Security
benefits due to the Secretary of Health and Human Service’s
failure to offer notices and services in Spanish.30 Plaintiffs
sought declaratory relief that this policy violated the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clause of the Federal
Constitution.31 Declining to apply a strict scrutiny analysis, the
court upheld the policy under a rational basis review.32
Hispanics as an ethnic group do constitute a suspect class for the
purpose of equal protection analysis. Nevertheless, the conduct at
issue here, the Secretary’s failure to provide forms and services in
the Spanish language, does not on its face make any classification
with respects to Hispanics as an ethnic group. A classification is
implicitly made, but it is on the basis of language, i.e., English-
speaking versus non-English speaking individuals, and not on the
basis of race, religion, or national origin. Language, by itself, does
not identify members of a suspect class.33
25 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 357-58; Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
26 SeeWilliamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 486 (1955).
27 See id.; City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-40. (1985).
28 See Williamson, 348 U.S. at 490.
29 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439-40.
30 Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36, 36-37 (1983).
31 Id. at 37-38.
32 Id. at 42.
33 Id. at 41 (internal citations omitted).
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In similar letter and spirit to its federal counterpart,
Article I § 11 of the New York Constitution stipulates that “No
person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this
state or any subdivision thereof.”34 Article I § 11 was expanded
by the enactment of Civil Rights Law § 40-c.
1. All persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to
the equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof.
2. No person shall, because of race, creed, color, national origin,
sex, marital status, sexual orientation or disability . . . be subjected
to any discrimination in his civil rights . . . by the state or any
agency or subdivision of the state.35
New York courts have held that the guiding inquiry into
whether or not state action violates the equal protection clause
of the New York Constitution “turns ultimately on the similarity
or dissimilarity of rights differentiated by a statute; and the
reasonableness of classification when different methods are used
to affect different classes.”36 New York jurisprudence would
arguably provide more protection to historically disenfranchised
demographics such as women and individuals with a mental
disability; whereas federal courts have declined to extend strict
scrutiny protection to these two groups,37 New York explicitly
provides this legal protection in its constitution. Although the
New York Constitution explicitly forbids discriminatory state
action on the basis of certain enumerated classifications, thus
enlarging the set of government classifications considered to be
presumptively invalid, New York judges employ the identical
strict scrutiny/rational basis analysis as their federal counterparts
when faced with a constitutional challenge to a non-enumerated
government classification.38
Similar to federal law, the New York Constitution does not
list language as a suspect classification.39 Offering slightly more
protection to linguistic minorities, New York courts have held
that “[a]lthough language by itself does not identify members of a
suspect or protected class, it can be a basis of a finding of
discrimination based on national origin when it creates a
34 N.Y CONST. art. I, § 11.
35 N.Y CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 40-c (McKinney 2014).
36 8200 Realty Corp. v. Lindsay, 27 N.E.2d 647, 653 (N.Y. 1970).
37 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996); City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985).
38 See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 6 (N.Y. 2006); Maresca v.
Cuomo, 475 N.E.2d 95, 98 (N.Y. 1984); Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, 348 N.E.2d
537, 542 (N.Y. 1976); Neale v. Hayduk, 316 N.E.2d 861, 862 (N.Y. 1974).
39 See N.Y CONST. art. 1, § 11.
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discriminatory result against all persons who do not speak
English rather than persons of any particular nationality.”40 In
line with the general progressive nature that often characterizes
the state, New York courts have been sensitive to the fact that
classifications based on language, though not explicitly
discriminatory, may be implemented in ways that create
“discriminatory result[s].”41 Despite this cognizance, the state’s
courts have declined to accept that all non-English-speaking New
Yorkers constitute a suspect class entitled to strict scrutiny
protection.42 Accordingly, at this moment, New York and federal
jurisprudence regarding government classifications based on
language is essentially identical.
II. CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OFWHETHER
LINGUISTICMINORITIES CONSTITUTE A SUSPECT CLASS
Whether denying a non-English-speaking arrestee the
opportunity to take a coordination test violates that arrestee’s
rights has not been heavily litigated in federal or state courts.
Though the case law is still developing, there have been a
number of cases in recent years which have ruled on the issue.43
Originally, when these cases first began reaching the bench,
there appeared to be no identifiable trend, with some courts
applying the more demanding strict scrutiny analysis, while
other courts applied rational basis review.44 This inconsistency
was most evident in Bronx Supreme Court, which deliberated on
the issue four separate times between 2008 and 2010, but
reached four different rulings.45 This lack of judicial harmony
persisted throughout the city until October 2013, when, for the
first time, a state appellate court held that the NYPD procedure
was to be reviewed under a rational basis analysis.46
New York courts first encountered the issue of whether a
NYPD officer’s failure to administer a physical coordination test
to a non-English-speaking defendant violated that defendant’s
constitutional rights under the Equal Protection Clause in
40 Yellen v. Baez, 676 N.Y.S.2d 724, 726 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1997).
41 Id.
42 People v. Salazar, 973 N.Y.S.2d 140, 144 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
43 See Salazar, 973 N.Y.S.2d at 144; People v. Burnet, 882 N.Y.S.2d 835, 842 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2009); People v. Garcia-Cepero, 874N.Y.S.2d 689, 695-96 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008).
44 Garcia-Cepero, 874 N.Y.S.2d at 695; Burnet, 882 N.Y.S.2d at 842-43.
45 Garcia-Cepero, 874 N.Y.S.2d at 698; Burnet, 882 N.Y.S.2d at 844; People v.
Molina, 887 N.Y.S.2d 784, 794; People v. Perez, 898 N.Y.S.2d 402, 408 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
46 Salazar, 973 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
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People v. Garcia-Cepero.47 There the defendant was arrested
after officers observed him driving on the wrong side of the road
and was subsequently charged with operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol.48 Although the defense did
not raise any constitutional challenges to the NYPD’s procedure,
the court found that the specific facts at issue “required [the
court] to decide whether . . . the New York Police Department’s
procedure of requiring only a breathalyzer test of non-English
speaking individuals while requiring a breathalyzer and a HGN
field test of English-speaking individuals, violates the Equal
Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution and the
New York State Constitution.”49
The court’s eagerness to tackle the issue on its own
initiative may make it less surprising to learn that it held the
NYPD’s procedure violates the Equal Protection Clauses of
both the New York and Federal Constitution.50 The court found
that the policy was “inherently discriminatory against non-
English-speaking individuals”51 and there was “no reasonable
or rational basis to differentiate between English speaking and
non-English speaking individuals.”52 The court, however, also
noted that it was not the regulation, VTL § 1194(b), which
differentiated between English and non-English-speaking
individuals, but the practice adopted by the NYPD.53 In fact,
the court emphasized that the regulation in question was
facially neutral, reading “[e]very person shall . . . submit to a
breath test to be administered by the police.”54
The court reached the opposite conclusion in People v.
Burnet.55 The defendant there was arrested and charged with
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol
and the unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle.56 The defendant
submitted that he had suffered a violation under the New York
and Federal Constitutions’ Due Process Clauses due to the
NYPD’s policy of only administering the coordination test to
English-speaking motorists.57 The defendant also claimed that his
47 Garcia-Cepero, 874 N.Y.S.2d at 692.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 696.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 695.
54 Id. (emphasis removed from original).
55 People v. Burnet, 882 N.Y.S.2d 835 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
56 Id. at 835.
57 Id. at 838.
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rights had been violated under the Equal Protection Clause due to
the NYPD’s failure to provide an interpreter during the
breathalyzer testing procedure, and thus the evidence should be
suppressed.58 Although the defendant challenged the NYPD’s
physical coordination test procedure under the Due Process
Clause, the court’s holdings are directly applicable.
Reaffirming that a defendant who does not speak English
must understand court proceedings in which he or she is
involved, the court held that the breathalyzer testing procedure
was neither a judicial nor a criminal proceeding, but rather an
administrative proceeding.59 Hence, there is no fundamental right
at stake in the application of the NYPD’s DWI psychophysical
test.60 The court also wisely declined to apply a strict scrutiny
review of the NYPD policy, explicitly stating that “[n]either the
federal nor the state constitution identifies all persons who do
not speak English as members of a suspect or protected class.”61
The court noted that the defendant would need to “demonstrate
that the members of this so-called suspect class, non-English
speaking criminal defendants, have been the subject of
discriminatory behavior based on race, nationality or ethnicity”62
in order to succeed on this claim, but failed to do so here.63
Ultimately, the court held that the NYPD practice was rationally
related to avoiding confusion, on the part of the officer and the
defendant, through the administration of the coordination test.64
Yet again, in 2009, the Supreme Court of Bronx County
had another opportunity to rule on this issue. In People v.
Molina,65 the defendant was arrested for driving while under the
influence of alcohol.66 A jury trial found the defendant guilty on
the counts of reckless driving and driving while ability impaired by
alcohol.67 Relying on Garcia-Cepero, the defense argued that the
NYPD’s policy under VTL 1192(1) was facially unconstitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause in that it deprived the
defendant, and all non-English-speaking motorists, the opportunity
to take the physical coordination test.68 Departing from the steady
58 Id. at 837-38.
59 Id. at 843.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 842-43.
62 Id. at 843.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 People v. Molina, 887 NY.S.2d 784 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
66 Id. at 787.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 788.
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legal footing of Burnet, the court found that “the defendant in this
case, a person of Hispanic origin whose primary language is
Spanish, is a member of a protected class twice over.”69 In an
attempt to rationalize its holding with Burnet, the court reviewed
the NYPD procedure under a rational basis analysis as well and
held that that the procedure fails to meet even this legislatively
deferential standard of review.70
[U]nlike Burnet, our facts clearly depict a defendant of Hispanic
origin and ethnicity who is discriminated against because of an
alleged language barrier and not because of a desire to avoid
“confusion and/or complications.” Therefore, even under the rational
basis test, the discriminatory procedure due to an actual language
barrier or arbitrarily determined language barrier under the facts of
our case has no rational basis and violated [the defendant’s]
constitutional rights.71
The court addressed the same issue once again in People
v. Perez.72 The defendant here was arrested for driving through a
toll booth without paying the requisite fee.73 After a jury verdict
found the defendant guilty of driving while intoxicated, the
defendant moved to set aside the verdict on the grounds that his
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection under
the law had been violated when he was not administered a
physical coordination test that would have been administered to
an English-speaking defendant.74 Rejecting this argument, the
court took pains to note that “the defendant’s national origin had
no bearing on the highway officer’s actions. For example, for many
Hispanics born in the United States, English is their first language
or, if not, they nevertheless do understand English. Accordingly,
English-speaking Hispanics are offered the coordination test.”75
Hence, the court chose to apply “the legitimate governmental
purpose test,”76 a test closely analogous to the rational basis test, in
analyzing the defendant’s equal protection claim.77 The court found
that the NYPD’s practice was rationally related to avoiding
confusion through the administration of the coordination test and
the efficient allocation of limited police resources.78
69 Id. at 792.
70 Id. at 793-94.
71 Id. at 794.
72 People v. Perez, 898 N.Y.S.2d 402, 404 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 406.
76 Id. at 407.
77 Id. at 405-06.
78 Id. at 407.
2015] AN IMPAIRED STATE OF THE LAW 1621
In People v. Pelegrin79 the court reemphasized that under
a rational basis standard of review, the NYPD’s DWI arrest
procedure does rationally relate to a legitimate state interest.80
Here too, the defendant was arrested and charged with operating
a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs after
the police observed him driving erratically.81 The defendant
admitted to having drunk alcohol earlier that night, and a
chemical test analysis at the IDTU uncovered that he had a BAC
of .13.82 The defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him,
alleging that the charges are premised on violations of the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Federal and New York
Constitutions.83 The defendant claimed that the NYPD’s testing
procedure resulted in “two classes of suspects . . . (1) English
speakers who are afforded ‘two opportunities to show that they
are or are not intoxicated,’ and (2) non-English speakers who are
‘limited’ to the BAC test.”84
In contrast to the holdings in Garcia-Cepero and Molina,
the court held that “government actions that classify individuals
on the basis of language do not receive heightened scrutiny
because such classifications, although inextricably intertwined
with ethnicity in the cases of many, is not a classification that is
identified as a suspect classification under the controlling case
law.”85 In step with Burnet and Perez, the court here held that
“[a]bsent either intentional discrimination against a suspect
class or the implication of a fundamental right, rational basis
review applies.”86
The Honorable Rodrigues-Morick, writing for the court,
also expounded on the validity of a possible disparate impact
claim.87 Noting that a law does not necessarily have to be facially
discriminatory to have a discriminatory impact, the court held
that the existence of a suspect class can also be proven by
demonstrating that “a state actor applied an otherwise facially
neutral law or policy in a discriminatory manner and intended
to do so.”88 Ceding that the NYPD’s policy was not facially
discriminatory, the defendant attempted to make a showing of
79 People v. Pelegrin, 959 N.Y.S.2d 401 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2013).
80 Id. at 407.
81 Id. at 404.
82 Id. at 406.
83 Id. at 404.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 405.
86 Id. at 405-06.
87 Id. at 406.
88 Id. at 405.
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discrimination through a disparate impact claim.89 In order to
make out a successful disparate impact claim, the defendant was
required to prove that that there was in fact a disparate impact
on a given class and that the disparate impact was intentionally
orchestrated.90 However, the defendant was unable to make the
showing of intentionality needed to succeed on the claim.91 The
crux of the defendant’s argument was simply that as the city’s
largest linguistic minority, Spanish-speaking New Yorkers will
likely suffer the greatest impact under the current NYPD
procedure.92 The court found this to be unpersuasive, reaffirming
that “standing alone, [such impact] does not trigger the rule that
racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny.”93
In October of 2013, a state appellate court ruled on the
issue for the first time in People v. Salazar.94 By this time, some
New York courts had held that the NYPD practice was subject to
strict scrutiny analysis,95 while others had held that it was subject
to the more deferential rational basis standard.96 After a jury trial
convicted the defendant of driving while intoxicated, the defendant
submitted a motion to set aside the verdict on the grounds that
the NYPD’s policy of administering a physical coordination test to
English-speaking DWI suspects, while not offering the same test
to non-English-speaking DWI suspects, violated the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States and New
York Constitutions.97 Granting the defendant’s motion, the trial
court held that the NYPD’s procedure created a “classification
predicated upon a person’s Hispanic origin and their inability to
speak and/or understand the English language and therefore
discriminates against primarily Spanish speaking individuals of
Hispanic origin”98 and dismissed all charges.99
Finally offering clarity on the conflicting lower court
rulings, the Appellate Division of the First Department
expressly rejected the holding of Molina and found that the
“[lower] court erred in concluding that the defendant’s
89 Id. at 406.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 406-07.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 406 (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976))
(alterations in original).
94 People v. Salazar, 973 N.Y.S.2d 140, 142 (N.Y. App. Div.).
95 People v. Molina, 887 N.Y.S.2d 784, 794-95 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
96 People v. Perez, 898 N.Y.S.2d 402, 407 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010); People v.
Burnet, 882 N.Y.S.2d 835, 842-43 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
97 Salazar, 973 N.Y.S.2d 140, 142-43 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
98 Id. at 143.
99 Id.
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constitutional rights to equal protection of the law and due
process were violated by the Police Department practice under
consideration.”100 Quoting Soberal-Perez, the court held that
“language, by itself, does not identify members of a suspect
class”101 and that the NYPD procedure was facially neutral in
regards to ethnicity.102 Reviewing the NYPD practice under a
rational basis review, the court found the practice to be
rationally related to ensuring the reliability of the coordination
test and the efficient allocation of limited law enforcement
resources.103 The court held the New York and Federal
Constitutions offer “equivalent constitutional safeguards”104
and did not conduct a separate inquiry under both.105
The court did not end its analysis there. Prudently noting
that facial neutrality does not preclude the defendant from
proving intentional discrimination, the court also dove into an
analysis of a potential disparate impact claim.106 Once again
turning to Soberal-Perez, the court held that in order to make
out a successful disparate impact claim, the defendant must
demonstrate that the “decision maker . . . selected or reaffirmed
a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of ’ [and] not
merely ‘in spite of ’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group.”107 Salazar represents the current position of New York
jurisprudence on the constitutionality of the NYPD practice.108
III. EVALUATING POTENTIAL CHALLENGES TO THENYPD
PROCEDUREUNDER THE FEDERAL ANDNEW YORK
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES
With the exception of Burnet, which explored whether a
defendant may be able to avail himself of strict scrutiny
protection if there was a fundamental right at stake,109 the
overwhelming majority of the decisions outlined above focus on
the applicability of strict scrutiny protection through the use of a
100 Id. at 9.
101 Id. at 10.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 11.
104 Id. at 9.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 10.
107 Id.
108 Daniela Giordano, Disparity in Police Procedures for Non-English
Speaking DWI Suspects: Constitutional Protections for Non-English Speaking Criminal
Defendants Falling Second to Governmental Interests, 30 TOURO L. REV. 1243 (2014).
109 People v. Burnet, 882 N.Y.S.2d 835, 842 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
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suspect classification.110 Thankfully, this is not the first time a
court has been confronted with such a legal dilemma. The Court
in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center111 was faced with a
similarly novel issue when it determined that the total
population of Americans who are mentally handicapped cannot
constitute a suspect class and are thus incapable of availing
themselves of the strict scrutiny standard of review.112 The court
held that the municipal ordinance in question, requiring
“‘hospital[s] for the feeble minded’” to obtain a special permit
was not rationally related to a legitimate state interest because
there was no evidence that the group home would pose any
danger to the municipality’s legitimate interests.113
The Court laid out four factors that it used to determine
whether or not a specific demographic warranted the designation
of a “suspect class.”114 These four factors are (1) whether the
disadvantaged group in question has faced a history of
discrimination, (2) whether that group has access to the political
process, (3) whether the challenged classification is based on an
immutable characteristic, and lastly, (4) whether the classifying
factor has an impact on an individual’s “ability to cope with and
function in the everyday world.”115 A review of the Cleburne
factors confirms that non-English-speaking individuals do not
qualify as a suspect class. Thus, the NYPD practice of only
offering the coordination test to English-speaking motorists
should not be reviewed under a strict scrutiny analysis.
The first factor, whether or not the purported suspect class
has faced a history of discrimination, poses an interesting and
informative question in regards to the scope of this proposed
suspect class: which individuals are included within it? The
notion that the suspect class in question here is comprised of any
homogeneous amalgamation of individuals is completely false.
The proposed suspect class cannot accurately said to be comprised
of all individuals of Hispanic background; a Hispanic New Yorker
who is arrested for a DUI would be provided both the
breathalyzer and coordination test if that individual spoke
English. Furthermore, it cannot be accurately stated that the
suspect class is comprised of all Spanish-speaking individuals or
any other linguistic minority; an individual, of any ethnicity, may
110 See supra Part II.
111 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
112 Id. at 442-43.
113 Id. at 437.
114 Id.at 442-45.
115 Id. at 442.
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be equally proficient in English and another language and thus
would be offered the coordination test. Alternatively, an
individual’s primary language may not be English, but that
individual may nonetheless be able to effectively communicate
with an English-speaking police officer, in which case the test
should also be offered.
Moreover, different groups of ethnic and linguistic
minorities have faced different forms and magnitudes of
discrimination at different points in this country’s past. Classifying
these various demographics into one suspect class on the basis of
their shared history of discrimination would require an
impermissible stretch of both logic and history and thus cannot be
the basis of a suspect class designation.
Discrimination against various ethnic demographics
generally manifested itself most prevalently during the epoch in
which that demographic was beginning to immigrate to the
United States. For example, discrimination against Italian-
Americans was pervasive from 1880 to 1920, during which time
more than four million Italians migrated to the United States.116
Once they arrived at Ellis Island, more than a third of all Italian
immigrants remained in New York City.117 A combination of anti-
immigrant sentiment and bustling urban expansion resulted in
Italian-Americans being the victims of housing and employment
discrimination,118 but by the 1940s, Italian-Americans throughout
the country had, in large part, succeeded in assimilating into
American society.119 By the onset of World War II, “Italian
Americans step[ped] permanently into the center of U.S. cultural
life”; over a million Italian Americans enlisted in the armed forces
and millions more contributed by working in factories vital to the
national war effort.120 This service “brought Italian Americans
even greater social mobility, more access to education, and a higher
116 Immigration: Italian, The Great Arrival, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
http://www.loc.gov/teachers/classroommaterials/presentationsandactivities/presentatio
ns/immigration/italian3.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2015).
117 A City of Villages, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/teachers/
classroommaterials/presentationsandactivities/presentations/immigration/italian5.html
(last visited Mar. 17, 2015).
118 Tenements and Toil, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/teachers/
classroommaterials/presentationsandactivities/presentations/immigration/italian6.html
(last visited Mar. 17, 2015); Working Across the Country, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
http://www.loc.gov/teachers/classroommaterials/presentationsandactivities/presentations/
immigration/italian7.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2015).
119 A Century in the Spotlight, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS., http://www.loc.gov/
teachers/classroommaterials/presentationsandactivities/presentations/immigration/ital
ian9.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).
120 Id.
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profile in the nation’s popular imagination.”121 As a result, the
children and grandchildren of that proud generation saw many
more opportunities and far fewer instances of discrimination.122
Discrimination against Chinese immigrants, which was
most prevalent from 1849 to 1882, took a different form.123
Unlike the vast majority of Italian immigrants who came to the
United States via Ellis Island,124 most Chinese immigrants that
came to the United States during the second half of the
nineteenth century migrated to the West Coast.125 Originally
attracted by the California Gold Rush of 1849, Chinese
immigrants were welcomed by Western industrialists who were
enticed by the prospect of a cheap labor force.126 Hence, many
Chinese immigrants found work as agricultural laborers or on
railroad construction crews.127 In response to “rising social
tensions,” California passed a wide range of restrictive measures
from 1850 to 1870 aimed at discouraging Chinese immigration,
including requiring Chinese immigrants to obtain special
business permits.128 As the nation fell upon difficult economic
times during the 1870s, financial hardship and low job prospects
caused “dislike and even racial suspicion and hatred”129 of
Chinese-Americans by other recent immigrant groups, as well as
many Americans, who were now all competing for a limited
number of career opportunities.130 In some instances there were
even anti-Chinese riots. This anti-Chinese sentiment, coupled
with the fragile economic climate of the time, tragically led to
the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.131
There was no comparable state action, either state or federal,
against Italian or other European immigrants. Furthermore, given
that “other immigrants,”132 or other predominantly non-English-
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 See Rise of Industrial America, 1876-1900: Chinese Immigration to the
United States, 1851-1900, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/teachers/
classroommaterials/presentationsandactivities/presentations/timeline/riseind/chinimms/
(last visited Feb, 28, 2015).
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Milestones: 1866-1898: Chinese Immigration and the Chinese Exclusion Acts,
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-





131 Rise of Industrial America, 1876-1900: Chinese Immigration to the United
States, 1851-1900, supra note 123.
132 Id.
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speaking demographics, were a key impetus for the passage of the
Chinese Exclusion Act, designating all individuals who do not
speak English as their primary language as a suspect class would
be an insult to the reasoning behind why suspect classes are
formed in the first place: to offer specific, well defined legal
protections to an otherwise vulnerable minority group. A plunge
into American history will reveal multiple instances of racism and
discrimination perpetrated by different groups against different
groups. The proposed suspect class of all non-English-speaking
individuals is itself capable of being subdivided into numerous
other suspect classes,133 some of which may have plausible claims
of discrimination perpetrated by other sub-suspect classes.
The first Cleburne factor questions whether the group in
question has suffered a history of discrimination, a straightforward
question that is incapable of a straightforward response. This
incongruence should disfavor the application of a strict scrutiny
analysis in reviewing the NYPD procedure, as the proposed
suspect class that is being discriminated against is more
accurately described as a number of distinct suspect classes.
Under the second Cleburne factor, the Court questioned
whether the proposed suspect class has access to the political
process.134 The same inherent difficulty in evaluating the first
Cleburne factor is present in the second factor as well: different
linguistic minorities have faced varying degrees of exclusion from
the political process.135 This recognition led Congress to amend
the Voting Rights Act in 1975 to include the minority language
provisions embodied in Sections 203 and 4(f)(6).136 Prior to the
enactment of this amendment, Congress found pervasive voting
discrimination against voters who spoke Spanish, various Native
American dialects, and various Asian languages:137
[The Congress finds that], through the use of various practices and
procedures, citizens of language minorities have been effectively
excluded from participation in the electoral process. Among other
factors, the denial of the right to vote of such minority group citizens is
ordinarily directly related to the unequal educational opportunities
afforded them resulting in high illiteracy and low voting participation.
133 See CAMILLE RYAN, LANGUAGE USE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2011, AMERICAN
COMMUNITY SURVEY REPORTS 1 (Aug. 2013), available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/2013pubs/acs-22.pdf (discussing the large number of languages other than English
spoken in the United States).
134 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 465-66 (1985).
135 See supra Part III.
136 See Civil Rights Monitor, LEADERSHIP CONF., http://www.civilrights.org/
monitor/vol8_no5_6/art2.html.
137 Id.
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The Congress declares that, in order to enforce the guarantees of the
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to the United States Constitution,
it is necessary to eliminate such discrimination by prohibiting these
practices, and by prescribing other remedial devices.138
The amended legislation prohibits any “state or political
subdivision”139 from only offering voting material,140 broadly defined
to include “registration or voting notices, forms, instructions,
assistance, or other materials or information relating to the
electoral process, including ballots,”141 in solely English, in
political divisions where a single linguistic minority represents
more than 10,000 individuals, makes up five percent or more of
the total voting population, is on an Indian reservation, or has an
illiteracy rate that is higher than the national average.142
Admittedly, a single piece of legislation cannot cure decades
or centuries of voting discrimination. The second Cleburne factor,
however, does not question whether a certain minority group
participates in the political process, but rather whether that
minority group has access to the political process. Sections 203
and 4(f)(4) of the Voting Rights Act unambiguously signal the
federal government’s intent of bringing formerly disenfranchised
groups into the election process. Tangentially, aside from a
change in governance, a change in national politics has also
facilitated the entry of non-English-speaking voters into the
political process. The 2012 election highlighted the critical and
growing role that predominantly non-English-speaking voters
play in elections, particularly in swing states such as Virginia,
Florida, Nevada, and Colorado.143 Both campaigns released
television commercials in Spanish and made concentrated efforts
to woo Spanish-speaking voters.144
Although the right to vote is arguably the crown gem in a
minority group’s struggle to gain access to the political process, it
is by no means the sole measure of that access. Further examples
of non-English-speaking individuals becoming engaged in the
political process can also be found through their membership in
various forms of civic society. The barriers that once blocked






143 See Elizabeth Hartfield, Spanish Language Campaign Ad Spending Lags,
ABC NEWS (Oct. 1, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/10/campaign-ad-
spending-aimed-at-hispanics-lags/.
144 Id.
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and the second Cleburne factor, which probes political access,
also suggests that applying strict scrutiny to the NYPD
procedure is unwarranted.
The third Cleburne factor requires the briefest analysis of
the four factors: the ability, or inability, to speak a language is not
an immutable characteristic. Virtually any human being is
capable of learning a new language. The fact that almost any
individual, through reasonable efforts, can remove him or herself
from the proposed suspect class, should strongly deter the
application of strict scrutiny to review the NYPD procedure. Were
a court forced to determine whether or not a plaintiff was in fact a
member of the suspect class at the time of the incident or practice
in question, both the credibility of the court and judicial efficiency
would be tarnished. The mere thought of a court administering
some type of English test to determine the validity of a plaintiff ’s
assertion that he or she does not speak the language is
cringeworthy. Furthermore, assuming for a moment that all non-
English-speaking individuals formed a coherent suspect class,
there is little uniformity even amongst this group. The American
Community Survey categorizes an individual’s English speaking
ability in one of four broad categories—very well, well, not well,
and not at all145—again further dividing the proposed suspect
class. Ironically, the fact that all the members of this proposed
suspect class can remove themselves from the suspect class
appears to be the strongest claim of homogeneity that the
proponents of applying strict scrutiny against the NYPD
procedure can assert.
In contrast to the analysis of the first three Cleburne
factors, an analysis of the fourth and final Cleburne factor, the
ability of members of the class to function in the everyday world,
suggests that strict scrutiny may be appropriate in reviewing the
NYPD procedure. An individual who cannot communicate in the
language of his or her host country will have difficulty completing
daily tasks such as personal banking and grocery shopping, let
alone gaining meaningful employment or receiving a college
degree. The vast majority of educational institutions in this
country teach in English. The ability to verbally communicate in
English is a skill which is a crucial factor towards gaining
meaningful employment.146 In fact, a recent study concluded that
the inability to speak English was the single greatest obstacle
145 Ryan, supra note 133.
146 Barry R. Chiswick & Paul W. Miller, Occupational Language Requirements
and the Value of English in the US Labor Market, 23 J. POPULARECON. 353, 368 (2010).
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facing immigrants in regards to societal integration.147 Thus, of
the four Cleburne factors, only the fourth suggests that NYPD
procedure should be reviewed under strict scrutiny.
Strict scrutiny review is also appropriate when a statute
or practice infringes on a fundamental right.148 But the NYPD
procedure in question does not infringe on a constitutional
right and thus does not warrant such an analysis.149 Although
“the failure to provide a qualified interpreter in court
proceedings would”150 fall short of the guarantee of due process
assured by the Fifth Amendment, the NYPD procedure is
“neither judicial nor criminal; it is administrative,”151 and thus
does not warrant a strict scrutiny analysis.
Those who view decisions such asMolina as a “step in the
right direction for courts providing equal protection of the laws to
non-English-speaking defendants”152 posit noble, but shortsighted
views on how to best protect the constitutional rights of this
vulnerable demographic.153 Legal scholars who argue that a strict
scrutiny analysis is a silver bullet in regards to protecting the
rights of non-English-speaking individuals mistakenly conceive a
suspect class comprised of solely Hispanic individuals.154
To reinforce this finding one needs to look no further than the
demographics of New York City which indicate an overwhelming
Hispanic population. Hispanics account for approximately 27.1% of the
population and, in the Bronx alone, where Garcia-Cepero, Burnet, and
Molina were decided, the Hispanic population is over fifty-one percent.
These statistics clearly depict an overwhelming need for greater equal
protection of the laws. Therefore, the Legislature and the NYPD
should develop procedures to protect non-English speakers’ rights. 155
Despite assertions to the contrary, non-English-speaking
is not synonymous with Hispanic.156 Non-English-speaking is not
synonymous with any ethnic or racial group. Justifications for a
strict scrutiny analysis that are grounded in fluid demographic
147 Immigrant Spouses Could Face English Test, GUARDIAN (Feb. 21, 2007),
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2007/feb/21/immigrationpolicy.race.
148 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
149 People v. Salazar, 973 N.Y.S.2d 140, 144 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013); People v.
Burnet, 882 N.Y.S.2d 835, 882 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
150 Burnet, 882 N.Y.S.2d at 843; see also He v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 593, 598
(9th Cir. 2003).
151 Burnet, 882 N.Y.S.2d 835, 843; Salazar, 973 N.Y.S.2d 140, 146 (2013).
152 See, Brian Shupak, Supreme Court of New York, New York County-People
v. Molina, 26 TOURO L. REV. 979 (2012).
153 See, e.g., id. at 991.
154 Id. at 991-92.
155 Id. at 991.
156 See Giordano, supra note 108.
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statistics are antithetical to the purpose of this timeless legal
protection. As Justice Powell observed, “[t]he concepts of ‘majority’
and ‘minority’ necessarily reflect temporary arrangements and
political judgments,”157 accordingly, any prudent legal rule must
look beyond the present composition of facts and consider the
implications of that rule on future legal claims.
Upon a cursory review of a DWI defendant’s legal
defense, one may reasonably conclude that a court mandate
requiring the Atlanta or Reno police department to provide
Spanish interpreters for non-English-speaking arrestees would
not necessarily impose a substantial burden on those
departments. Proponents of this view may find some solace in
the fact that aggregately, Spanish-speaking Americans saw the
largest gains in the population since 2000.158 Nevertheless, when
represented as a percentage, the “Other Asian languages” and
“African languages” categories, which include languages such as
Malayalam, Telegu, Amharic, Yoruba, and Swahili, saw
increases of more than 100%.159 The growth of the Spanish-
speaking population during the same time period was only
34%.160 Since 1980, eight other linguistic minorities, including
Russian, Persian, and Armenian, have also doubled in size.161
Interestingly, languages that were relatively prevalent before
the 1980s, such as Italian, German, Polish, and Greek, are
significantly less spoken today.162 Overall, in 2011, of the 291.5
million Americans age five and over, 60.6 million, or 21% of the
population, spoke a language other than English at home.163
In regards to the NYPD procedure, any legal standard
that is proposed with a specific minority group in mind will not be
conclusive. Admittedly, New York City’s demographic distribution
is not representative of the entire nation, but the city’s unique
degree of diversity can offer an insightful point of analysis.164 New
157 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 295 (1978).
158 Ryan, supra note 133, at 6-7.
159 Id. at 6.
160 Id. at 6-7.
161 Id. at 5.
162 Id. at 5-6.
163 Id. at 2.
164 See Court Interpreting in New York: A Plan of Action, N.Y. STATE UNIFIED
COURT SYS., (Apr. 2006), http://www.nycourts.gov/courtinterpreter/pdfs/action_plan_
040506.pdf. For societies with linguistic minorities that are relatively few in number and
relatively large in size, language barriers tend to pose fewer operational difficulties
because, in general, the fewer the number of languages, the easier for courts to provide
interpreter services. In New York’s environment of unparalleled linguistic diversity,
however, the task of providing interpreting services may be more challenging than for
any other judiciary in the nation, if not the world. Id. at 1.
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York City’s population of approximately eight million people is
currently more linguistically diverse than many localities
throughout the country.165 There are approximately 168 languages
spoken in New York City.166 Five million of the city’s denizens
speak a language other than English at home.167 Even more
noteworthy, unlike many municipalities with substantial linguistic
minorities, no single linguistic group comprises a majority, more
than 50%, of the non-English-speaking population.168 About a
dozen of the languages spoken are among the world’s most widely
spoken languages, and legal interpreters for these languages can
be located with relative ease;169 however, approximately 150 of
these languages are substantially less prevalent, and translation
services for these languages are much more difficult to provide.170
In short, demographics are fluid. As the demographics of a
community change, the interpretive needs of law enforcement in
that community will also change. Suddenly, the Atlanta and Reno
police departments, which accepted the rationale behind employing
Spanish interpreters, are now being asked to provide similar
interpretive services in Vietnamese and Urdu. The financial
burden of employing numerous translators twenty-four hours a
day, seven days a week may quite predictably prove to be
overwhelming, making it impossible for any police department to
guarantee that they will have a capable translator on call for
every non-English-speaking motorist who is stopped.
Reviewing the NYPD procedure under strict scrutiny,
and subsequently finding it to be unconstitutional, will not only
impose a burden on the city’s financial recourses, but its
administration of justice as well. When an intoxicated Polish,
Hindi, or Cantonese-speaking driver is stopped, that driver has
a strengthened equal protection claim if the police department in
question has instituted a policy of providing interpretive services
for only a select number of languages. The Supreme Court
similarly held that such a policy “would merely shift the alleged
discrimination to all other non-English-speaking groups.”171 It
165 Id. “Large metropolitan areas such as New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago
generally have large proportions of people who speak a language other than English at
home because of the economic opportunities in these places or because they act as gateway
points of entry into the country.” See also Ryan, supra note 133, at 10; New York City
Population 2014, WORLD POPULATION REP. (Oct. 2014), http://worldpopulationreview.com/
us-cities/new-york-city-population/.
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now becomes much more difficult to assert that the police
department policy of not offering interpretive services for one
linguistic minority is rationally related to the goal of the efficient
allocation of law enforcement resources, given that the same
policy authorizes interpretive services for another linguistic
minority. Under a strict scrutiny analysis, such a policy may be
difficult to sustain if the classifications based on language become
a proxy for classifications based on ethnicity.172 Considering that
it may well be a motorist who speaks Russian, Guajarati, or
another language that is not spoken with great frequency outside
the native ethnic population who challenges such a policy, the
claim that the language classification is in fact being used as a
proxy for ethnicity now has even greater merit.
Evidence obtained through a potential constitutional
violation is susceptible to a motion to suppress, and any
competent defense counsel is likely to submit such a motion.173
Additionally, defendants have every incentive to claim that their
constitutional rights have been violated while having virtually
nothing to lose by filing an additional motion. District Attorneys’
offices around the country would be forced to dedicate time and
resources to submit timely motions in response, leaving less time
and resources for other pending case. Inevitably, some of these
claims would be less ingenious than others, and the burden of
parsing through these claims to determine if the defendant was in
fact unable to speak English and thus have illegally obtained
evidence against him dismissed,174 would fall on courts throughout
New York City and other major metropolitan areas. Ultimately,
law enforcement, prosecutors, and the courts will be hindered in
completing one of their primary objectives—keeping the roadways
safe from intoxicated driver.
Thankfully, the NYPD has not gone down this path of
ruin, and the current policy only requires providing the physical
coordination test in English.175 Given that the entire non-English-
speaking population of New York City cannot be said to constitute
a suspect class, the NYPD policy should not be subject to strict
scrutiny review. Furthermore, with a backdrop of budgetary
172 Id.
173 In New York, the applicable statute is N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.30 (1)(f)
(McKinney’s 2014). “After arraignment upon an information, a simplified information,
a prosecutor’s information or a misdemeanor complaint, the local criminal court may,
upon motion of the defendant, dismiss such instrument or any count thereof upon the
ground that . . . [t]here exists some other jurisdictional or legal impediment to
conviction of the defendant for the offense charged.” Id.
174 Id.
175 People v. Salazar, 973 N.Y.S.2d 140, 144, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013).
1634 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:3
constraints, the NYPD policy is rationally related to the
legitimate state interests of the efficient allocation of limited law
enforcement resources and public safety. New York courts,
however, should be cautious not to enact an overly broad judicial
doctrine which may deprive non-English-speaking New Yorkers
of future legal protections outside of the criminal justice system.
Accordingly, New York courts should reserve the option of
reviewing a classification based on language under an intermediate
standard of review.
IV. A SUGGESTEDMIDDLE-OF-THE-ROAD APPROACH
Given that the NYPD policy in question does not employ
a suspect classification or infringe on a fundamental right, a
strict scrutiny analysis is inappropriate. One cannot deny,
however, that there is some specter of injustice at work here,
despite the fact that it may be difficult to legally cognize. The
NYPD’s procedure of not administering the physical coordination
test rationally relates to a number of legitimate government
purposes.176 Yet the possibility remains that the government
purpose behind a statute that classifies on the basis of language
may not be roadway safety or the efficient allocation of police
resources. Unfortunately, the possibility remains that such a
classification may be motivated by sheer animus.
Although none of the defendants in Garcia-Cepero, Burnet,
Molina, Perez, Pelegrin, or Salazar were able to make a showing
of intentional discrimination,177 the possibility of discriminatory
application of the procedure is far from foreclosed.178 Suppose an
arresting officer were to make a remark akin to “you’re not a real
American” and then refuse to administer the coordination test to
a DWI suspect. Suppose further that the suspect actually spoke
176 People v. Burnet, 882 N.Y.S.2d 835, 843 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009); People v. Perez,
898 N.Y.S.2d 402, 406 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010); People v. Pelegrin, 959 N.Y.S.2d 401, 407 (N.Y.
Crim. Ct. 2013); Salazar, 973 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
177 See supra Part I.B.
178 Erica Pearson, NYPD Didn’t Provide Translator, Mocked Language and
Arrested the Abused in Domestic Violence Calls Involving Spanish-speaking Victims:
Lawsuit. N.Y. DAILY NEWS, (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-
york/nypd-failed-spanish-speaking-vics-domestic-violence-calls-suit-article-1.1295531.
New York City Legal Services recently filed a lawsuit against the NYPD on behalf of
five immigrant women which alleges that the police refused to provide translation
services for the women when they reported incidents of domestic violence. It further
alleges that the actions of the police “degrade[e], ridicule[e] and otherwise mistreats
limited-English-proficient individuals who request interpreter services, actively
demeaning them for their lack of English proficiency.” 5 Hispanic Women Sue Over
Interpretation in NY, EPOCH TIMES, (June 26, 2013), http://www.theepochtimes.com/
n3/133075-5-hispanic-women-sue-over-interpretation-in-ny/?sidebar=related-below.
2015] AN IMPAIRED STATE OF THE LAW 1635
some English. This hypothetical is far from impractical,179 and the
defendant would still face a very difficult task in making out a
claim of intentional discrimination against the NYPD. Under a
mere rational basis analysis, a court may be relegated to
accepting a farce of a “legitimate state interest.”180 The courts in
Burnet, Perez, Pelegrin, and most recently on appeal, Salazar,
avoided a judicial misstep by declining to apply the heightened
scrutiny analysis,181 but the courts’ decision to apply a mere
rational basis review overlooks the reality that there is still a
need to offer some form of legal protection to this diverse,
vulnerable demographic.
The overriding public safety concerns that are manifest
in these cases result in an understandable lack of sympathy for
the non-English-speaking DWI defendants; however, it may not
always be the rights of a DWI defendant at issue. For example,
there has been a growing chorus of voices arguing that the Los
Angeles Unified School District should segregate non-English-
speaking and English-speaking elementary school students in
core classes.182 Proponents of this view assert that non-English-
speaking students deserve particularized attention and that
these students’ use of “Spanglish” in the classroom negatively
impacts the English comprehension of the other students.183 Yet
again, the government has articulated a seemingly legitimate
purpose, increasing the English proficiency of elementary
school students, which is rationally related to a non-suspect
classification. Were similar legislation proposed in New York,
the proposed segregation of elementary school students should
be upheld under the reasoning of Salazar, which is heavily
grounded in the court’s opinion in Soberal-Heckler.
Accordingly, New York courts should limit their holdings
so as to not foreclose the possibility of offering linguistic
minorities future legal protections. Rather than broadly holding
that classifications on the basis of language are to be reviewed
under a rational basis analysis, courts should leave the option
open to review such classifications under a rational basis plus,
intermediate review.
179 Pearson, supra note 178.
180 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
181 People v. Salazar, 973 N.Y.S.2d 140, 144 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013); People v.
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The United States Supreme Court has faced similar
dilemmas in the past.184 When confronted with the prospect of
applying strict scrutiny against a local zoning ordinance that
discriminated against homes for the mentally challenged, the
Court engaged in a particularly “probing inquiry”185 of the local
ordinance in question but invalidated the statute on rational
basis grounds.186 As Justice Marshall, writing the concurring
opinion, pointed out,
[T]he Court’s heightened-scrutiny discussion is even more puzzling
given that Cleburne’s ordinance is invalidated only after being
subjected to precisely the sort of probing inquiry associated with
[strict] scrutiny . . . . [U]nder the traditional standard we do not sift
through the record to determine whether policy decisions are squarely
supported by a firm factual foundation.187
Although writing critically of the Court’s rationale, Justice
Marshall’s criticisms articulate precisely why an intermediate
scrutiny analysis would be appropriate to review the proposed Los
Angeles school segregation plan. The touchstone of a rational basis
plus review is a “probing inquiry”188 or “searching analysis”189 into
the articulation of a government purpose that is typically
associated with a strict scrutiny analysis,190 not an inquiry that is
typically associated with the deferential standard articulated in
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma.191 As imperfect and
imprecise as it may be, intermediate review has become an integral
means by which courts protect the rights of vulnerable minority
groups that cannot avail themselves of strict scrutiny review.
Accordingly, an intermediate scrutiny analysis is the appropriate
standard of review for government classifications that differentiate
on the basis of language.
The Court acted in a similar fashion in U.S. v. Virginia,192
when it held that Virginia Military Institute’s (VMI) male only
admissions policy, which had been in place since its inception in
1839, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th
Amendment.193 VMI asserted that its male only educational
184 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 458; United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 539
(1996); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 210 (1996).
185 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 458.
186 Id. at 449-50.
187 Id. at 458.
188 Id.
189 Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 728 (1982).
190 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
191 Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 486-88 (1955).
192 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
193 Id. at 519.
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environment was essential to its goal of creating “citizen-
soldiers,”194 and that, were it forced to admit women, the program
would be so drastically altered that it would be unable to continue
its mission.195 Additionally, VMI also claimed that the availability
of a male only educational setting contributed to the diversity of
educational choices within the state.196
Although tenuous, there does appear to be some correlation
between the state’s use of a gender classification and its purported
goals, enough of a correlation to satisfy the barebones rational
basis review established in Williamson.197 Private schools and
religious schools still regularly continue to offer single-sex
educational settings, suggesting that these institutions, and the
students who attend them, see the educational benefits of these
settings. The continued success of these educational settings also
suggests that there is a market for single-sex education; hence,
one is justifiably perplexed over why the goal of enhancing the
diversity of educational options is considered insufficient by the
Court, which held that VMI’s male only policy was not rationally
related to its stated objectives.198 This perplexity is addressed if
one accepts that rational basis plus review serves as the Court’s
coping mechanism for situations when it is unable to offer a
vulnerable minority group the suspect class designation it desires,
but still recognizes the pressing need to offer that group greater
legal protections.
Similarly, in Romer v. Evans,199 Colorado voters passed an
amendment to the state constitution via a statewide ballot
referendum which forbade any form of “legislative, executive, or
judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to
protect the status of persons based on their ‘homosexual, lesbian, or
bisexual orientation, conduct, practice or relationships.’”200 The
state alleged that the reasoning behind the amendment was to
place gays and lesbians on an equal legal footing as all other
individuals within the state, but upon remand, a state court held
the amendment to be in violation of the federal Equal Protection
Clause.201 Applying a strict scrutiny analysis, the court found no
compelling state interest.202
194 Id. at 521.
195 Id. at 540.
196 Id. at 535.
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The United States Supreme Court affirmed the ruling on a
different rationale.203 Declining to hold sexual orientation as the
basis of a suspect classification, the court once again claimed to
apply a rational basis review.204 Yet again, rather than simply
hold that the amendment was or was not rationally related to
Colorado’s claimed purpose, Justice Kennedy chose to dive into
the rationale behind the amendment, stating that the Court
“insist[s] on knowing the relation between the classification
adopted and the object to be attained”205 and that the “sheer
breadth [of the amendment] is so discontinuous with the reasons
offered for it”206 that the motivation for its enactment is nothing
but pure animus.207 This seems to be a departure from the Court’s
position in Williamson, where it stated that a “law need not be in
every respect logically consistent with its aims to be
constitutional.”208 Again, recognizing that the state action in
question is not subject to strict scrutiny because it does not
classify on the typical suspect classifications of race, religion, or
ethnicity,209 the Court conducted a particularly expansive rational
basis review, ultimately finding the amendment unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
It is not the accuracy of the Court’s “probing inquiry”210 that
is at issue here, but rather its appropriateness in the case at hand.
In Cleburne, U.S. v. Virginia, and Romer, the Court formally
declined to extend the legal protection of a suspect class designation
on the basis of mental handicap, gender, or sexual orientation.211
Despite this legal formalism, there appears to be recognition by the
Court that these minority groups are being discriminated against.
By following a similar doctrinal approach, New York courts should
ensure that the NYPD IDTU policy, one of only a few tenable
options to effectively enforce drunk driving laws in such a diverse
metropolitan area, remains in place while also guaranteeing that
linguistic minorities are not handicapped in future equal protection
claims. Using an intermediate scrutiny approach would allow the
203 Id. at 626.
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court to conduct a more searching analysis, without making
language classifications presumptively invalid.
Recently, there has been a national dialogue on policing,
particularly as it impacts communities with substantial minority
populations. Much of this dialogue has been focused on New York
City and the NYPD. The NYPD protocol which this note examines
is arguably offensive to many New Yorkers who speak a language
other than, or in addition to, English, not because they are likely
to be directly impacted by it, but because it denotes a preference
for one language over another. This discontent should not,
standing alone, hinder law enforcement officials from keeping the
public safe from intoxicated drivers who are selfish enough to
repeatedly endanger the lives of others. This discontent should
not, however, be completely marginalized, as it represents a
concern that generations of legal and socioeconomic progress,
which at times have been begrudgingly slow and hard fought, are
taking a step back. Accordingly, New York courts should be
mindful that legal doctrine adopted today in the name of public
safety may have drastically unintended consequences in the
future and is not easily rewritten.
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